Global recession hit the world economies badly from mid-2008 onwards. The growth prospects of companies were adversely affected. As companies aimed to survive or remain profitable they instituted severe measures to close down or realign businesses and operations and implement severe cost compression measures. Jobs were lost and savings were wiped out while purchasing power crumbled and customer confidence wilted.
Indian economy too faced the adverse impact of the global recession with reduced GDP growth and heightened liquidity crisis. The fiscal year 2008-09 represented one of the most excruciating years for Corporate India. Different companies, of course, were affected by the economic recession differently and also responded to the evolving situation differently. Companies in the core engineering sector and those who made aggressive overseas investments in the previous years were particularly under severe pressure.
The author examines in a series of papers as to how different Indian companies withstood the ravages of recession in a more enduring manner than most overseas firms could. This enquiry also results in an understanding of relevant business models and strategies as a subject of broader academic interest.
In the fifth paper of the series, the author examines how Tata Motors Limited (Tata Motors), fared in 2008-09. The conclusion that emerges from the study of Tata Motors (as from the earlier studies on Maruti Suzuki, India’s leading car manufacturing company, BHEL, India’s leading power and industrial equipment company, Tata Steel, India’s global steel company, L&T, India’s leading engineering and construction conglomerate – reference the other posts in the author’s blog, “Strategy Musings”) is that Indian companies did acquit themselves rather creditably due to their intrinsic fundamentals and business management skills. This, in turn, leads us to the interpretation that select Indian companies must set their sights higher and move on to higher trajectories of growth on a global canvas.
Tata Motors – Automotive giant of India
Tata Motors Limited is India’s largest full line automobile manufacturer, with a full range covering passenger cars, commercial vehicles (trucks and buses), utility vehicles and defense vehicles. In each of the segments again it offers a comprehensive range. In the segment of passenger cars, the range covers the world’s smallest and cheapest 4 seater car to the large, luxurious Jaguar cars. In the truck segment, the range extends from the micro truck Ace to multi-axle heavy trucks while in the bus segment, the range covers conventional high floor and newer low floor buses in different seating configurations. The utility vehicle range covers the indigenous Tatamobile, Sumo and Safari as well as the acquired Land Rover and Range Rover. With an ability to manufacture all the key aggregates such as engines, gear boxes, axles, frames, cabs and bus bodies as well as a capability to have its own castings, forgings and component supplies. Tata Motors is one of the most diversified and integrated automobile manufacturers of the world. It also manufactures earth moving equipment and standalone diesel engines for generator sets.
Tata Motors is the only automobile manufacturer outside of the developed world (ie., US, Europe, Japan and Korea India
Tata Motors was initially established in 1945 under the name of Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Ltd (Telco) as a private sector enterprise to manufacture locomotives. It changed its business in 1954 deciding instead to manufacture trucks and buses in collaboration with Daimler Benz of Germany. Mr J R D Tata, the noted industrialist, was the first Chairman of Telco and was responsible for developing Telco as the largest commercial vehicle manufacturer in the country with significant backward integration into castings, forgings and press metal forming and tool and die manufacture. Soon Telco became the flagship company of the Tata group and a symbol of India’s industrial capability as it decoupled itself in 1969 from the Daimler Benz collaboration rather boldly and started development of its own truck and bus models. The company was rechristened as Tata Motors in 2003.
Tata Motors has a history of innovative automotive product development especially relevant for Indian conditions. Its products rewrote market segmentation in India from time to time. Tata Semi Forward Cowl vehicle blazed a new trend in medium commercial vehicle (MCV) industry in the 1970s. Tata 407 and Tata 608 trucks ushered in a new light commercial vehicle (LCV) market segmentation in the 1980s. Despite the not so successful efforts to enter the passenger car segment through utility vehicles (Tatamobile, Tata Sierra and Tata Estate), Tata Motors persevered and succeeded with Tata Sumo (1994) and Safari (1998), which were runaway successes and opened up a new sports cum rural utility vehicle segment from the mid-1990s. Tata Indica passenger car was the first indigenously developed passenger car and redefined family transportation once again (post-Maruti) from its very launch in 1998. The recent micro truck Tata Ace revolutionized intra-city transport from 2005. The latest small car offering, Nano, at a price of Rs 100,000 (USD 2100) is a landmark development in the global car industry.
In recent times exciting chapters of globalization were written in Tata Motors’ history. In 2004, Tata Motors acquired Daewoo Commercial Vehicle Company Limited, Korea
Prior to these acquisitions, Tata Motors was a predominantly India-centric company with all the manufacturing facilities located in India. With the integration of Hispano, Daewoo and JLR & Land Rover brands Tata Motors became a relatively more global player.
The acquisition logic and challenge
Tata Motors’ acquisition driven strategy is certainly not as revenue accretive or market expanding as that of Tata Steel. Yet it is a path- breaking strategy for an industry known for its chronic dependence on imported technologies. That the overseas acquisitions came after a decade of path-breaking indigenous automobile developments should certainly be a matter of satisfaction for Tata Motors. Each of the acquisitions had its own logic.
Tata Motors was predominantly into medium commercial vehicles powered by diesel engines of up to 210 HP. It had competition from Ashok Leyland and Volvo which offered heavy vehicles powered by engines of 200 to 450 HP. Daewoo Commercial Vehicles (DCV), part of the bankrupt Daewoo Group, was Korea's second largest heavy truck maker with a modern plant in Gunsan that has an annual production capacity of 20,000 medium and heavy vehicles, powered by engines up to 450 HP.. It had a market share in excess of 25% in the Korean heavy truck segment. The acquisition of DCV at a price of USD 102 million helped Tata Motors to expand its product range and also accelerate its entry into new markets in China , Western Europe , South Africa and Latin America .
Mr Ratan N Tata, Chairman of Tata Motors commenting on the DCV acquisitionsaid, "This is a historic occasion for Tata Motors and the Tata Group. I am happy to note that this is the largest acquisition by any Indian company in Korea and I look forward to increasing the TATA Group's presence in this country. Korea is a shining example of what can be achieved with diligence and dedication, and I am sure we will learn a lot from operating in South Korea
Mr Kwang Ok Chae, President, said on behalf of the employees of DWCV, "It has been a very productive negotiation and all of us are happy to be part of Tata Motors, which is the sixth largest manufacturer of Commercial Vehicles in the world".
Mr Kwang Ok Chae, President, said on behalf of the employees of DWCV, "It has been a very productive negotiation and all of us are happy to be part of Tata Motors, which is the sixth largest manufacturer of Commercial Vehicles in the world".
Both Tata Motors and DCV believed that the combined strengths in technology, customer orientation and product development would provide a cutting edge for competing in international markets and create a new powerhouse in the commercial vehicles industry. Most analysts also felt that the DCV acquisition was a perfect fit. According to an analyst at ICICI Securities, "The fit is very good and will incrementally add around four to five percent to turnover and the same amount to profit." Analysts saw the acquisition as one which would enable Tata Motors to increase both its domestic and export earnings.
Indian commercial vehicle makers, Tata Motors included, did not possess world class bus body building technology. Hispano deal gave Tata Motors the license for technology and brand rights from Hispano. The total deal consisting of Equity, Debt & Technology Licensing added up to Euro 12 million (about Rs.70 crores). Hispano enjoyed a market share of 25% in the bus market in Spain, sold its buses in Europe and several other countries outside Europe. It has its own in house product development facility for buses and coaches. Mr Ravi Kant, the then Executive Director - Commercial Vehicle Business Unit, Tata Motors stated, "This strategic alliance with Hispano Carrocera will give us access to its design and technological capabilities to fully tap the growing potential of this segment in India and other export markets, besides providing us with a foothold in developed European markets".
While Tata Motors did exceedingly well as an Indian company to design and manufacture passenger cars from scratch and even showcase them in prestigious motor shows abroad, presumably the need to integrate certain car design and manufacturing capabilities of the West was still felt by Tata Motors. In June 2008, Tata Motors acquired the two iconic British brands - Jaguar and Land Rover (JLR) from the US-based Ford Motors for US$ 2.3 billion. Forming a part of the purchase consideration were JLR's manufacturing plants, two advanced design centers in the UK, national sales companies spanning across the world, and also licenses of all necessary intellectual property rights. Tata Motors was perceived to gain both technologically and market presence-wise from the deal. One, the acquisition would help the company acquire a global footprint and enter the high-end premier segment of the global automobile market. After the acquisition, Tata Motors would own its own Nano, the world's cheapest and smallest car, and luxury marquees like the Jaguar and Land Rover.
Commenting on the acquisition, Mr Ratan Tata, Chairman of Tata Motors, said, "We are very pleased at the prospect of Jaguar and Land Rover being a significant part of our automotive business. We have enormous respect for the two brands and will endeavor to preserve and build on their heritage and competitiveness, keeping their identities intact. We aim to support their growth, while holding true to our principles of allowing the management and employees to bring their experience and expertise to bear on the growth of the business."
Not all were sharing the optimism, however. Morgan Stanley reported that JLR's acquisition appeared negative for Tata Motors, as it had increased the earnings volatility, given the difficult economic conditions in the key markets of JLR including the US and Europe. Moreover, Tata Motors had to incur a huge capital expenditure as it planned to invest another USD 1 billion in JLR. This was in addition to the USD 2.3 billion it had spent on the acquisition. Tata Motors had also incurred huge capital expenditure on the development and launch of the small car Nano and on a joint venture with Fiat to manufacture some of the company's vehicles in India and Thailand. This, coupled with the downturn in the global automobile industry, further exacerbated by deep economic recession in all the developed markets which are the mainstay of the already ailing Jaguar and Rover brands, and the need to raise huge debt and equity to finance the acquisition, cast a deep shadow on Tata Motors’ financial position and prospects.
On the face of it, the multi-pronged strategy adopted by Tata Motors to widen the truck, bus and car product ranges and also simultaneously expand the global market footprint appears well conceived, though the choice of some of the target companies and the timing of the last acquisition could be debatable. Given that the company has already achieved a level of technical expertise in the design and manufacture of all kinds of automobiles, it is a moot point if the USD 2.3 billion price tag paid for JLR could have been better invested in further upgrading its organic design and manufacturing capabilities in India India
Notwithstanding the “perfect storm” of costly acquisitions and crashing automobile markets, the performance of the company in 2008-09 indicates the resilience of the company and the ability to deliver on the strategic vision.
Economies of scale and scope
Tata Motors represents a business model which derives growth and sustainability through product diversification and economies of scale and scope. The company’s domestic orientation, incremental innovation and cost leadership enabled it to continuously lead the Indian automobile industry and withstand the recessionary cycles witnessed from time to time, including the global economic crisis of 2008-09. With the JLR acquisition and the severe recession in Indian commercial vehicle markets, the company came to be delicately perched in terms of capital deployment and returns.
The financial performance of the company was adversely affected by the sharp de-growth in the Indian automobile sector. The commercial vehicle market shrunk by 17.4% to 415,652 vehicles and Tata Motors’ sales shrunk by 15.2% to 265,373 vehicles. Market share of the company in the commercial vehicle sector improved, however, from 62.2% to 63.8%. The passenger vehicles segment reduced only by 0.5% to 1,525,313 vehicles but the sales of the company reduced more sharply by 4.8% to 207,512 vehicles. Market share of the company in the passenger car sector dropped from 14.2% to 13.6%. The overall vehicle market reduced by 4.7% to 1,940,965 vehicles and Tata Motors overall vehicle sales reduced by 10.9% to 472,985 vehicles. The company’s overall market share reduced from 26.1% to 24.4%.
Within the commercial vehicle segment, the light commercial vehicle (LCV) segment grew by 1.2% to 232,090 vehicles in 2008-09, and Tata Motors registered a better than industry growth rate of 3% to reach a sale of 151,676 vehicles. Its dominant market share in the LCV segment further consolidated from 64.4% to 65.4%. The medium and heavy commercial vehicle (M & HCV) segments registered the sharpest fall of 33% to 183,562 vehicles and the M&HCV sales of Tata Motors also shrunk by 31.4% to 113,697 vehicles. In the passenger vehicle segment, the small car (mini and compact) segment registered a marginal growth of 0.7% to 936,500 vehicles in 2008-09 but Tata Motors’ sale in the segment dropped sharply by 17.1% to 115,160 cars. Market share in the small car segment dropped from 14.9% to 12.7%. The mid-size car segment registered a growth of 9.9% to 245,015 vehicles and Tata Motors registered a whopping growth of 68.8% in this segment to 53,057 vehicles. Market share in the mid-size car segment jumped from 14.1% to 21.7%. The utility vehicle / SUV segment registered a decline of 6.5% to 223,238 vehicles and Tata Motors registered a steeper decline of 17.6% to 39,295 vehicles. Market share in utility vehicle / SUV segment declined from 20% to 17.6%.
The standalone turnover of Tata Motors however reduced by 23.6% to Rs 285,992 million (USD 5.958 billion, USD 1 = Rs 48) reflecting the adverse M&HCV market situation. The consolidated turnover of the company, however, increased by 83.8% to Rs 741, 512 million. (USD 15.4 billion), reflecting the positive turnover impact o0f JLR brand acquisitions. Earnings Before Interests, Taxes and Depreciation (EBITDA) of the standalone operation reduced by 21.6% to Rs 26,784 million. However, the consolidated EBITDA reduced more sharply by 33.7% to Rs 29,964 million. Standalone Profit before Taxes (PBT) reduced. 55.4% to Rs 10,790 million while consolidated PBT registered a loss of Rs 17,900 million, compared to a profit of Rs 29,256 million in 2007-08 (a massive Rs 47,150 million loss during the year!). Standalone Profit after Tax (PAT) was down by 50.7% at Rs 10,138 million while the consolidated PAT plummeted to a loss of Rs 24,650 million, compared to a profit of Rs 22,348 million in 2007-08 (a net loss of Rs 47,000 million!). The consolidated financial performance reflects the impact of eroded profitability of the acquired JLR brands and also the sharp increases in depreciation (20% increase to Rs 25,068 million in 2008-09) interest costs (160% increase to Rs 19,309 million in 2008-09) consequent to the JLR acquisition.
Most automobile purchases are credit driven. With the recessionary environment affecting purchases as well as operating economies adversely and the liquidity in the financial markets drying up, sundry debtors have increased. The company’ standalone sundry debtors increased by 37.5% to Rs 15,552 million while consolidated sundry debtors increased by 133% to Rs 48,001 million. Sundry debtors as a percentage of sales increased from 3.42% to 5.44% in 2008-09 on a standalone basis, while the percentage increased by 5.1% to 6.5% in 2008-09 on a consolidated basis. It would appear that collection policies of the Indian market continued to be more disciplined compared to the overseas ventures.
Manufacture of automobiles is highly asset-intensive, requiring massive investments in tools, dies and manufacturing plants. The standalone fixed assets of the company increased by 40% to Rs 145,993 million while the consolidated fixed assets swelled by 178% to Rs 347,333 million, again reflecting the impact of the JLR acquisition. The sales to asset turnover of the standalone company worsened from 3.17 to 1.96 in 2008-09 while that of the consolidated group worsened from 3.14 to 2.08 in 2008-09.
The manpower costs increased marginally by 0.4% during the 2007-08 to Rs 15,514 million while the manpower increased marginally to 23,638. However, with decline in sales turnover, the revenue per employee (on rupee basis) declined from Rs 21.4 million in 2007-08 to Rs 18.4 million in 2008-09.
That the recession and acquisitions took its toll on cash generation is evident. Cash generated by operations reduced by 44% to Rs 15,567 million. Net cash generation of the company, after accounting for working capital and securitization transactions, dropped by 79% to Rs 12,950 million. Consolidated closing cash and bank balances reduced by 32% to Rs 11,418 million.
The company’s expenditure on R&D continued to be one of the highest in the Indian industry. In 2008-09, Tata Motors spent a higher amount of Rs 14,766 million on R&D, reaching 5.75% of the turnover, compared to Rs 11,960 million in 2007-08, corresponding to 4.2% of the turnover. The increase in R&D expenditure reflects the longstanding philosophy of Tata Motors to invest in R&D.
Six strategic drivers
In contrast to Tata Steel, Tata Motors appears to be following a policy of letting the subsidiaries, associates and the newly acquired brands operate as autonomous entities. Unlike in Tata Steel’s case, it is not evident that global group leadership and corporate teams have been established in respect of Tata Motors. Assuring that there are no issues of cultural integration, the need for Tata Motors appears to be in terms of using strategic and operational levers for profitable growth.
The success of Tata Motors acquisition and expansion led growth strategy depends on six primary components: continued market dominance, capital structure stabilization, asset integration, value chain optimization, cost leadership and technological differentiation. These are also essential to cope with the pressure caused by the acquisitions and global operations in a period of intense global recession. The leadership of Tata Motors, headed by Mr Ratan Tata, Chairman and Mr Ravi Kant, Vice Chairman acted with alacrity to put in place institutional mechanisms that meet the six strategic criteria. The new position of Managing Director – India Operations has been created to preserve the robustness of the Indian operations while Mr Ravi Kant, the principal driving force behind the series of acquisitions continued to oversee the overseas operations, besides having the oversight for domestic operations thus facilitating overall asset, operational and value chain integration.
Continued market dominance
Continued, if not increased, market dominance is the key to the success of Tata Motors. Despite the runaway success of its sub-one tonner Ace, the company’s market share gains in the LCV segment have been muted. The company needs to come up with “aces” in the 2 to 5 tonne payload light intermediate commercial vehicle segment to be in an unassailable position. In the absence of such a product strategy, as a current dominant player, Tata Motors could face erosion in future with the envisaged LCV competition from Ashok Leyland-Nissan combination. The company also needs to significantly raise its market share in the small car and utility / sports vehicle categories. Post-Nano, global automobile manufacturers have decided to make India a hub of small car production. Tata Motors needs to consider new product options in the small car and utility vehicle range as well. While in the M&HCV sectors the company seems to have held its ground, the anticipated synergy of DCV acquisition in terms of a significant foray into high end commercial vehicles did not seem to have occurred. In addition to the above, the delays in the launch of Nano need to be offset by fail-proof launch and accelerated ramp-up of its production. Similarly the JLR brands which lost 30 to 35% of their market shares in their markets need to claw back their shares and also enter newer markets. Lack of significant export penetration is yet another cause of concern. As a global automotive company, Tata Motors must eventually aim to derive at least 50% of its turnover from overseas markets, compared to the current level of less than 10% derived from exports.
Capital structure stabilization
The acquisition of the JLR brands came at a price tag, which looks expensive, post-economic meltdown. The company has taken short term bridge loans to finance the acquisition and also issued equity on rights basis to the shareholders to prepay in part the bridge loan. While the debt-equity ratio remains comfortable at 1.08:1, the high interest costs even at this level of debt and the inability of the operations to service the larger equity base dictate the need for measures to strengthen the capital structure further. Rather than any fresh equity induction, a strategy of higher revenues and better gross margins needs to be implemented to generate cash that is required to prepay the debt. Such a strategy would also improve the declining sales-asset ratios, increase asset utilization, reduce unit costing and enhance profitability. As can be seen, overseas asset base is over 50% of the total asset base and needs to be sweated even more to restore the company to beneficial asset turnover ratios. In addition, strategies to restructure the zero coupon foreign currency convertible notes into longer term instruments, without losing the benefit of zero coupon rate are also urgently called for.
Asset integration
With domestic asset base now constituting only 41% of the total asset base, the ability of the company to meaningfully integrate domestic and overseas asset base could hold the key to company achieving improved asset utilization. The task is all the more challenging as the overseas assets are established and consolidated for different product blocks and may not be amenable for easy integration. That said, there could be higher operational synergies between Land Rover manufacturing plants and the advanced design and engineering facilities that were acquired on one hand and the established Indian utility / commercial vehicle manufacturing infrastructure and R&D centers on the other. Innovations like intelligent start / stop system patented on the Freelander range of Land Rover utility vehicles and the established 4X4 vehicle technology of the Land Rover vehicles could be extended to the company’s domestic vehicle range. In addition, the Land Rover infrastructure could be used to launch a new breed of off-road military and civilian vehicles for Indian defense and para-military services. An integrated asset base could enhance the company’s ability to achieving a larger global footprint with customized product offerings and better market segmentation.
Value chain optimization
One of the premises of the global acquisition strategy by Tata Motors is that the acquired companies would be providing high end design and manufacturing capabilities and market specific know-how to Tata Motors (besides providing range expansion) while Tata Motors would be providing low cost, high quality materials, components and aggregates. In addition, Tata Motors could be providing enterprise and group resource planning services through information technology. Given also that Tata Motors has a number of subsidiaries and associates to manufacture diesel engines (Tata Cummins), bus bodies (Hispana, Tata Marcopolo and ACGL), auto components (INCAT and TACO), construction equipment (TELCON), design houses (TMETC), tooling and equipment (Tata Precisions), co-branded products with Fiat (Fiat India Automobiles) and financial products (Tata Finance) and so on the need to integrate the value chain is acute. Tata Motors had as of March 31, 2009 as many as 70 subsidiaries and 7 associates globally which together with Tata Motors India and the acquired JLR infrastructure constitutes a formidable value chain. It would appear that the organization of Tata Motors is directed towards autonomous management of various entities and achievement of operational excellence in such enterprises. This capability perhaps needs to be reinforced with corporate leadership teams which strengthen the management of the overall group value chain.
Cost leadership
Cost leadership is the fifth essential component required for Tata Motors to become a full-fledged global automobile force. Nano type of cost position needs to be a rule rather than an exception for Tata Motors to be a dominant player. This would accrue from optimization of the total supply chain, integrating new concepts of low weight, high performance materials and components, building of greater flexibility and versatility in work station design, absorption of low cost high automation manufacturing technologies from Korea, cross-fertilization of cost leadership ideas from associates and subsidiaries, simplification of product range with varied front-end or superstructure options with common or shared platforms, minimization of carbon footprints and so on. Continuous improvements in shop floor, logistics and commercial operations and in business processes combined with break-through technologies in products and processes would be required. Comprehensive plans to reduce tare weights of automobiles which increasing the performance would not only improve the cost position but also enhance value proposition to the customers.
Technological differentiation
The sixth dimension of success would relate to technological differentiation. Tata Motors is well ahead of its Indian peers in terms of its investments in R&D. However, Tata Motors may need to subscribe to a policy of more frequent model changes and more aggressive implementation of cross-over designs to develop a constantly modernizing product range. Given that Tata Motors has now luxury brands as evidenced by the JLR strategy, an ability to master frequent model changes with continuous improvements in looks as well as performance would be called for. As with Nano, vehicle concepts which capture the imagination of customers need to be developed across the full spectrum. An Asian truck model could be one concept, before a world truck is developed. Introduction of electric powered vehicles, hybrid vehicles and vehicles powered by clean fuels could be taken up as a separate design SBU to develop differentiated products.
In order to achieve durable technological edge, Tata Motors may need to collaborate with input manufacturers such as steel makers, foundries and forging makers to explore fundamental ways of modernizing their technologies to meet the needs of new generation of automobiles.
In the overall, Tata Motors has achieved global recognition not only by emerging as the dominant Indian automobile group through indigenous design and manufacturing efforts but also by acquiring overseas brands and infrastructure to diversify product range and sharpen technical skills. The strength of the domestic market and operational base has helped the company withstand the twin impact of a deep recession in the automobile markets and the enormous pressures of a debt-funded multi-billion dollar overseas acquisition. A six-pronged strategy of continued market dominance, capital structure stabilization, asset integration, value chain optimization, cost leadership and technological differentiation would position Tata Motors higher in the future. However, these six strategic components must be managed in complete coordination to deliver superior results in terms of enduring economies of scale and scope on one hand and design and operational excellence on the other hand that befit Tata Motors as a global automotive giant.
Posted by Dr CB Rao on October 5, 2009
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